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1Combinatorial Auction-Based Pricing for
Multi-tenant Autonomous Vehicle Public
Transportation System
Albert Y.S. Lam
Abstract—A smart city provides its people with high standard
of living through advanced technologies and transport is one of
the major foci. With the advent of autonomous vehicles (AVs),
an AV-based public transportation system has been proposed
recently, which is capable of providing new forms of trans-
portation services with high efficiency, high flexibility, and low
cost. For the benefit of passengers, multitenancy can increase
market competition leading to lower service charge and higher
quality of service. In this paper, we study the pricing issue
of the multi-tenant AV public transportation system and three
types of services are defined. The pricing process for each
service type is modeled as a combinatorial auction, in which the
service providers, as bidders, compete for offering transportation
services. The winners of the auction are determined through an
integer linear program. To prevent the bidders from raising their
bids for higher returns, we propose a strategy-proof Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves-based charging mechanism, which can maximize
the social welfare, to settle the final charges for the customers.
We perform extensive simulations to verify the analytical results
and evaluate the performance of the charging mechanism.
Index Terms—Autonomous vehicle, combinatorial auction,
smart city, VCG mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH limited resources and high population density,people of many cities suffer from deteriorating living
environments, health problems, traffic congestion, and pollu-
tion. To improve the standard of living, we may turn a city
into a smart city through smarter utilization of resources with
modern technologies [1]. Transport is one of key sectors in
smart city research and development. The future transportation
system should be able to accommodate the massive volume
of passengers, support a broader range of services, and lessen
its impact on the environment. To design an intelligent trans-
portation system, we may contemplate the infrastructure, the
vehicles, and the supportive management system. In most of
the well-developed cities, there is not much room to have large
modifications to the existing infrastructure and developing
infrastructure usually involves a long time span. To facilitate
widely applicable transportation in the near future, we may
focus on the vehicles and the management system. We may
utilize various advanced vehicular technologies to enhance
the performance of a transportation system. As being able
to accommodate more passengers, we will focus on public
transport in this paper.
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Autonomous vehicles (AVs) refer to those vehicles capable
of driving themselves without human intervention. They can
adapt and respond to various situations happened on the roads
due to their strong sensing and self-control abilities. They
possess many advantages, including fewer traffic collisions,
increased roadway capacity, alleviation of parking scarcity,
and reduction in car theft [2]. Many companies have already
invested in the AV industry. Google launched the Self-Driving
Car Project in 2011 [3]. Automotive manufacturers, like BMW
[4] and Mercedes-Benz [5], are inventing their AVs for mass
production. Moreover, related law has been passed in Nevada,
Florida, California, and Michigan to allow AVs driving on
public roads [6]. All these show that the AV is a promising
technology and it will become one of the major elements in
the future transportation system.
Recently a new AV-based public transportation system was
proposed in [7], where AVs are utilized as the conveyances to
carry passengers in a city. The system can be made automatic
and adaptive to transportation requests, with the consideration
of traffic conditions. There is a control center (e.g., a central
computing facility) for managing and scheduling the AVs,
and making other related decisions for the system. Through
adaptive scheduling, the optimal routes with the minimum
operational cost can be determined for the AVs. With advanced
vehicular communications technologies, like vehicular ad-hoc
networks [8], the AVs become connected able to exchange
information with the control center. Due to the unmanned
nature, the AVs can coordinate with each other, and loyally and
accurately follow the instructions from the control center. The
system allows ride sharing; passengers may share their rides
with other people, as buses. Moreover, the system supports
point-to-point services; a passenger can specify the pick-up
and drop-off locations with various time requirements, as taxis.
Hence the AV public transportation system provides new forms
of transportation services with high efficiency, high flexibility,
and low cost.
Increasing market competition can lead to better prices,
quality of services, and information for consumers with more
choices. For the benefit of its residents, a smart city may allow
its AV public transportation system to be operated by multiple
service providers, that results in a multi-tenant system. In
such a system, there is still one control center for information
gathering and central decision making, but the AVs are divided
into groups, each of which is governed by an independent
service provider (or called an operator). While the technical
scheduling and admission control mechanisms have been fully
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2addressed in [7] and [9], there are no clear rules about how to
set the service charges for the system, especially the multi-
tenant system. In this paper, we aim to study the pricing
issue for the multi-tenant system and propose a combinatorial
auction-based pricing scheme, where the service charges are
determined through the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mech-
anism [10], [11], [12]. Our scheme can maximize the social
welfare and it is strategy-proof such that all bidders (i.e.,
the operators) have no incentive to lie about their private
information in the auction.
Auctions have been widely used to settle prices for many
engineering systems. In [13], the uniform pricing and pay-as-
bid pricing were settled with a multi-unit auction in a short-
term electricity market. [14] constructed a double auction to
determine the price with quantity for energy trading in a
vehicle-to-grid system. In [15], a multibid auction scheme
was designed to allow users to compete for bandwidth in
telecommunication networks. [16] designed a multi-unit se-
quential sealed-bid first-price auction for spectrum trading in
cognitive radio networks. Due to its desirable properties, VCG
is a powerful mechanism in mechanism design. Samadi et al.
proposed a VCG-based mechanism to maximize the aggregate
utility of all users and minimize the power generation cost for
demand side management in the smart grid [17]. [18] proposed
a VCG-based resource allocation mechanism with the Kelly
mechanism so that efficiency is attained at Nash equilibrium
points. In [19], the VCG mechanism was utilized to procure
resources and select cloud vendors in cloud computing. We can
see that, with many successful applications, a VCG-auction-
based mechanism can be utilized to address the pricing issue
of the multi-tenant AV public transportation system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present
the system model in Section II. We construct the combinatorial
auction for the system in Section III and Section IV discussed
the VCG-based charging mechanism. We verify the analytical
results and evaluate the system performance in Section V.
Finally we conclude this paper in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first introduce the model of the AV public
transportation system and then pinpoint its pricing process.
A. Autonomous Vehicle Public Transportation System
The AV public transportation system was firstly proposed
in [7], in which the control center coordinates a fleet of
AVs to provide transportation services. Customers submit
transportation requests to the control center with necessary
information, including pickup and dropoff locations, service
times, number of passengers, etc. After collecting a number of
transportation requests, the control center assigns appropriate
AVs to serve the requests. When serving the requests, the
AVs may be carrying the passengers from other requests and
this realizes ride-sharing. Due to the unmanned nature of the
vehicles, we need to determine the schedules and routes for the
designated AVs in order to admit the transportation requests.
This can be accomplished by solving the scheduling problem,
which was fully addressed in [7], [9]. Moreover, not every
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Fig. 1. Multi-tenant AV public transportation system.
request can be served because the requirements stated in the
request may not simultaneously be satisfied by any vehicle
available. We need to perform admission control to screen
out those infeasible requests for effective scheduling. The
admission control problem is given as a bi-level optimization,
in which the scheduling problem is considered as a constraint.
The details can be found in [9].
[7] and [9] focused on the technical aspects of the system,
in which a monopoly is simply assumed to operate the system.
In this paper, we generalize the operation model by support-
ing multi-tenancy. In a multi-tenant AV public transportation
system, multiple fleets of AVs are operated and managed by
independent operators.1 The vehicles under the same tenant
are cooperative but those belonging to different tenants are not.
For the transparency of information and benefits of customers,
we design a central “market” to convene all the received
transportation requests. This market is run by a broker who
aims to match the service “buyers” and “sellers”. In other
words, upon a service request r has been submitted by a
customer, the broker tries to see if there is any operator able
to provide the service. The operators will assess r by checking
its admissibility and the corresponding operational cost2 and
this will result in one of the following cases: (1) no operator
can admit r; (2) only one operator decides to admit r; and (3)
more than one operators intend to “sell” their service for r.
Cases 1 and 2 are simple. For Case 1, we may simply ignore
r or keep it on hold for later consideration. For Case 2, the
winning operator will schedule an AV to serve r based on
the result of scheduling. So the complication mainly comes
from Case 3 where the broker should decide one appropriate
operator to complete the deal. Hence we need a mechanism to
select one of the competing operators based on some criteria
1For implementation, we can consider that the control center is operated in
a cloud [20] and the AV operators are also engaged in the same or different
clouds.
2The operational cost for serving a request is determined through admission
control and scheduling and the methodologies discussed [9] can still be carried
through in the multi-tenant system.
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Fig. 2. The pricing process.
and designing such an mechanism will be the focus of this
paper.
As discussed in [7], [9], in a monopolistic system, there
is a control center responsible for information gathering and
decision making. In fact, in a multi-tenant system, the control
center can act as the broker to arbitrate admission competition,
i.e., Case 3 above. The system is depicted in Fig. 1. Customers
submit transportation requests to the control center through
any appropriate means (e.g., mobile apps and phone calls) and
each submitted request contains all the necessary information
about the service, e.g., service starting point and destination,
service start time and end time, the number of seats occu-
pied, etc. When receiving a transportation request from a
customer, the control center disseminates the information to
the operators. Based on the methods discussed in [7], [9], each
operator can independently assess the request according to the
conditions of its governed vehicles, estimate the operational
cost for providing the service, and decide which vehicle in
its fleet is carrying out the service. Based on the estimated
operational cost, the operator will list its proposed service
charge at the control center.
B. Pricing Process
The pricing process of the multi-tenant system is ma-
nipulated by the control center and its schematic can be
found in Fig. 2. Based on [9], the system operates in an
interval basis, where the pricing process takes place in the
duty assignment sub-interval, following the schuduling and
admission control processes. After collecting the proposed
charges from all potential service providing operators, the
control center performs the pricing process and determines the
winner(s) of the competition with a set of settled prices for the
service.3 Suppose that all vehicles are homogeneous in terms
of capacity and each has Q seats. Consider that the number
of seats required for request r is qr.4 Assuming 1 ≤ qr ≤ Q,
normally the customer is interested in three types of services:
• Splittable service: The service is allowed to be supported
by more than one vehicle. In this way, the passengers of
the request will be split into multiple groups and travel
on separate vehicles. Yet we do not exclude the situation
that all passengers may stay along in the same vehicle in
some cases. We denote the charge of the splittable service
by cs.
• Non-splittable service: The service is accomplished by
one single vehicle only. This accounts for the situation
3The reason why returning a set of settled prices instead of just one price
will be explained next.
4We call a person who submits the request a customer, and who takes the
ride a passenger. For request r, there is one customer and qr passengers. A
customer is not necessarily one of the passengers.
that the passengers prefer to stay along together during
the journey. The charge of the non-splittable service is
denoted by cn.
• Private service: The service is solely supported by one
vehicle and no other passengers of other requests are
allowed to stay in the vehicle during the time serving
r even though there are not enough passengers to occupy
the whole vehicle. In other words, the passengers desire
to hire a private vehicle for the travel. We denote the
charge of the private service by cp.
With the values of cs, cn, and cp, the customer can then make
the final decision of adopting which service type based on its
own preference. For example, if cs is much lower than cn
and cp, the customer may make a cost-effective decision and
go to the splittable service. If cp has a similar value as of
cs and cn, the customer may choose the private service for
privacy. Note that the customer does not need to take care
of which operator(s) or vehicle(s) will eventually provide the
service. The pricing process will consolidate all the proposed
charges from the operators and determine the best service
prices for the customer, who will only see the settled prices of
the three service types. Based on the customer’s decision, the
control center will match the operator(s) for the customer. The
involved operator(s) will then carry out the plan for providing
the service according to the schedules resulted from the prior
scheduling process.
Note that each pricing process is supposed to determine
the service charges for one service request. Since the system
operates in an interval basis, there may be multiple service
requests being handled at the same time in each interval. In
fact, after scheduling and admission control [9], the service
requests which are being processed are no longer dependent
and thus we can simply apply the pricing process to each
of these service requests and compute the results in parallel
simultaneously.
III. COMBINATORIAL AUCTION
We model the pricing process with combinatorial auctions,
one for each service type.5 In a combinatorial auction [21],
there are a number of discrete items for sale or asking
for sellers. Bidders can place bids on combinations of the
items instead of individual items. An auctioneer facilitates the
auction and decides the winners based on the submitted bids. If
the bidders are buyers, for the benefit of the owner of the items,
the bidders with the highest bids will win. On the other hand,
if the bidders are sellers, for the welfare of the item requester,
the bidders with the lowest bids will be the winners. For the
pricing process, seat occupancies are the items to be traded.
For request r, we need to assign qr seats from various AVs to
the passengers. We can interpret the customer of request r as
the “buyer” of the transportation service and it needs qr seats
to be ‘sold”. Those operators who are interested in “selling”
their seats are the bidders and they place bids on combinations
5Note that the design of the combinatorial auction in this section and the
charging mechanism in the next section do not rely on the the technical details
of [7] and [9].
4of seats. The control center acts as the auctioneer to facilitate
the auction.
Consider request r with qr seats required and there are K
operators interested in serving r. Let K be the set of bidders
and hence |K| = K. Assume that both the buyer and sellers
are rational; for the same service, the customer aims for the
lowest price while the operators try to win other bidders for
offering the service. All vehicles governed by the operators are
homogeneous such that their capacities are all identical.6 Let
Q be the capacity of each vehicle. Without loss of generality,
we assume
1 ≤ qr ≤ Q. (1)
As discussed in [7], a request with the number of seats required
larger than Q can be considered as multiple requests such
that they all require the seat quantities smaller than Q. We
also assume that all seats are homogeneous; in a vehicle,
the passengers only care about the number of seats available,
instead of the positions and conditions of the seats. We define
a set Q = {{1}, {1, 2}, . . . , {1, 2, . . . ,m}, . . . , {1, 2, . . . , Q}}
and it is the collection of seat combinations for lease, where
{1, 2, . . . ,m} represents a set of m seats. For each combina-
tion S ∈ Q, bidder k ∈ K has a valuation vk(S) for letting S.
This valuation is the base price for the lease. If the customer
pays less than vk(S), operator k will induce a negative utility
for letting S. Recall that bidder k can determine the cost
of offering S from the scheduling and admission control
processes. It may set vk(S) by marking up the cost with a
certain guaranteed return. In the auction, bidder k places a
bid bk(S) for each S ∈ Q. Occupying a seat always induces
a charge. This can be realized by making bk(·) an increasing
function with the size of seat combination; for S, T ∈ Q, if
|S| < |T |, then bk(S) < bk(T ). Since the vehicles may be
serving other passengers at the time of auctioning off request
r, the numbers of seats available in various vehicles can be
different. Let Qk be the number of seats offerable by bidder
k ∈ K. If S corresponds to the seats with quantity larger than
that available, i.e., |S| > Qk, we can simply set its valuation
vk(S) and bid bk(S) with sufficiently large numbers such that
k will not win S in the auction. This is equivalent to the fact
that S will never be allocated to k. Bidder k may make more
profit by raising bk(S) higher than vk(S). In general, we can
assume bk(S) ≥ vk(S) ≥ 0, for all S ∈ Q. Moreover, each
bidder only concern about what it will receive in the auction
but not the results of other bidders.
We construct one auction for each service type. Next we
investigate how the auctioneer determines the winners of the
auctions and we model these decision making processes with
integer linear programs. We define the binary variable xk(S)
to indicate if S is allocated to k, i.e.,
xk(S) =
{
1 if S is allocated to k,
0 otherwise.
6Since AVs are unmanned, the vehicular specifications should follow some
standards which be strictly regulated by the government. Also vehicles of
similar size have advantages of simpler control and interaction between
vehicles. Moreover, it is likely that the operators adopt similar models of
AVs for business. Thus, for simplicity, we assume that all vehicles are
homogeneous.
For the benefit of the customer, the service should be provided
by those operators charging the least. The objective is to
minimize the total bids charged by the operators and the
corresponding objective function is
p =
∑
k∈K
∑
S∈Q
bk(S)xk(S). (2)
p is the optimal payment that the customer should pay for
the service. For some reasons (explained in Section IV), the
customer will be charged with a higher amount. We will
discuss how to determine the final charge from p in Section
IV.
Lemma 1. With an increasing concave bidding function, each
bidder can at most win with one bid in the combinatorial
auction for each service type.
Proof: Suppose bidder k wins two bids, e.g., for S, T ∈
Q, in the auction. It is impossible to have |S|+ |T | > Q. By
(1), the customer will never request a service which provides
unnecessary seats with avoidable extra cost. Now we focus
on S and T with |S| + |T | ≤ Q. Recall that seats are
unidentifiable while the elements in Q are identified with
the seat quantity only. So we will always find U in Q such
that |U| = |S| + |T |. Since bk(·) is an increasing concave
function, bk(U) < bk(S) + bk(T ). As we are minimizing (2),
the customer will adopt U instead of the combination of S
and T . This induces a contradiction. Hence, each bidder can
at most win with one bid.
In general, the marginal cost of seat occupancy is diminish-
ing. When a vehicle has been assigned to traverse from one
place to another, the extra cost of holding one more passenger
is rather limited if the route does not need to be altered. In
this case, bk(·) is an increasing concave function, i.e., for
m ≤ Q − 2, S = {1, . . . ,m},S ′ = {1, . . . ,m,m + 1}, and
S ′′ = {1, . . . ,m,m + 1,m + 2}, we have bk(S ′) − bk(S) ≥
bk(S ′′)− bk(S ′).
However, if the bidding function is not concave, Lemma 1
will not not hold. To ensure a seat not be let more than once at
the same time, we explicitly impose the following constraint:∑
S∈Q
xk(S) ≤ 1,∀k ∈ K. (3)
We will utilize (3) to formulate the optimization problems for
the splittable, non-splittable, and private services.
A. Splittable Service
For the splittable service, once all bids have been submit-
ted, the auctioneer determines the winner(s) by solving the
following optimization problem:
minimize
∑
k∈K
∑
S∈Q
bk(S)xk(S) (4a)
subject to
∑
S∈Q
xk(S) ≤ 1,∀k ∈ K (4b)∑
k∈K
∑
S∈Q
|S|xk(S) ≥ qr, (4c)
xk(S) = {0, 1},∀S ∈ Q, k ∈ K. (4d)
5Constraint (4c) guarantees that the offers have enough seats
as stated in the transportation request while Constraint (4d)
confines that xk(S) is a binary variable. Note that (4) may
result in an offer that all seats come from the same vehicle as
long as the offer incurs the lowest bid in total.
Lemma 2. For the splittable service, the number of seats
allocated in the auction must be equal to that stated in the
transportation request.
Proof: For request r, the number of seats required is qr.
Suppose that x˜ = [x˜k(S)]k∈K,S∈Q is a global minimum of
Problem (4) such that∑
k∈K
∑
S∈Q
|S|x˜k(S) > qr.
We construct another x∗ from x˜ as follows:
• For each k ∈ K, if ∑S x˜k(S) = 0, then ∑S x∗k(S) = 0;
• Among those k and S with x˜k(S) = 1, for some of the
k, we set x∗k(T ) = 1 on T instead of S, where T is a
smaller set with |T | < |S|, while for the other k, we set
x∗k(S) = 1. This assignment of x∗ needs to satisfy∑
k∈K
∑
S∈Q
|S|x∗k(S) = qr. (5)
The above construction of x∗ ensures that (4b) and (4d) are
satisfied. Hence x∗ is also a feasible solution of (4). Since
bk(·) is an increasing function and x∗ is set on some smaller
T , ∑k∑S bk(S)x∗k(S) is smaller than ∑k∑S bk(S)x˜k(S).
Hence x˜ cannot be a global minimum and this induces a
contradiction. Therefore. a global optimum x∗ of (4) should
satisfy (5), which is equivalent to the statement of the lemma.
From this lemma, we can make (4c) an equality so that the
feasible region of (4) becomes smaller. However, in general,
most existing integer programming solvers tackle problems
with inequality more effectively than with equality. That is
the main reason that we relax (4c) as an inequality.
B. Non-splittable Service
Similar to the splittable service, the auctioneer determines
the winner of the auction for the non-splittable service by
addressing the following problem:
minimize
∑
k∈K
∑
S∈Q
bk(S)xk(S) (6a)
subject to
∑
S∈Q
∑
k∈K
xk(S) ≤ 1, (6b)∑
k∈K
∑
S∈Q
|S|xk(S) ≥ qr, (6c)
xk(S) = {0, 1},∀S ∈ Q, k ∈ K. (6d)
(6) is similar to (4) except (6b), which ensures that the offer
will be accomplished with at most one subset of seats in Q
from all bidders. In fact, (6b) implies (4b). In this way, the
passengers will be not split into multiple vehicles for the travel.
C. Private Service
For the private service, the offer should be originated from
one single vehicle, in which no other customers have been
pre-assigned. The setting is similar to that for a non-splittable
ride, but the number of seats required is equal to the capacity
of a vehicle, i.e., Q. The auctioneer can determine the winner
with the following problem:
minimize
∑
k∈K
∑
S∈Q
bk(S)xk(S) (7a)
subject to
∑
S∈Q
∑
k∈K
xk(S) ≤ 1, (7b)∑
k∈K
∑
S∈Q
|S|xk(S) ≥ Q, (7c)
xk(S) = {0, 1},∀S ∈ Q, k ∈ K. (7d)
(7) is similar to to (6) by replacing qr with Q in (7c). It ensures
the offer will be made to S from an empty vehicle.
D. Results of the Auctions
In combinatorial auctions, Problems (4), (6), and (7) belong
to the class of Winner Determination Problem [21], but the
formulations given above are dedicated to the multi-tenant AV
system. Let ps, pn, and pp be the optimal objective function
values of Problems (4), (6), and (7), respectively.
Theorem 1. The total bid required to accomplish the splittable
service is the lowest while that for the private service is the
highest, i.e., ps ≤ pn ≤ pp.
Proof: ps, pn, and pp are the objective function values of
the global optimums of Problems (4), (6), and (7), respectively.
These minimization problems share an identical objective
function. The result can be proved if we can show that the
feasible region of (4) embeds that of (6), which in turn embeds
the feasible region of (7).
For (4) and (6), their constraints are the same except (4b)
and (6b). It is not difficult to see that (6b) is a special case of
(4b). Hence the feasible region of (4) embeds that of (6).
Similarly, for (6) and (7), their constraints are the same
except (6c) and (7c). It is trivial to see that (7c) is a special
case of (6c). Thus the feasible region of (6) embeds that of
(7).
Theorem 1 matches our intuition in the quality of service.
If we desire to hire a private vehicle, the charge should be
higher than that for a shared ride. If we do not mind to have
the passengers being allocated on different vehicles, the charge
should be lower than that of having all passengers reside on
the same vehicle. It is because a splittable ride provides higher
flexibility for the operators to schedule their vehicles with
lower operational cost.
Note that in (4), (6), and (7), the winners of the auction
are determined based on the submitted bids bk(S). Mathemat-
ically, they are constant and they are solely assigned by the
respective bidders. Thus the values of ps, pn, and pp depend
on bk(S). We cannot directly set ps, pn, and pp to be the final
charges because we have no way to prevent the bidders from
manipulating their bids for possible higher profit. If bk(S) is
6replaced by the true valuation vk(S) in (4), (6), and (7), the
corresponding ps, pn, and pp will provide lower bounds on
the payments that the customer needs to pay, as no bidder
k bids below vk(S). Apparently, it seems that the auctioneer
cannot strike the payments toward these lower bounds for the
three types of services. In the next section, we will design a
charging mechanism to address this issue.
IV. CHARGING MECHANISM
For (4), (6), and (7), the solutions are said to be eco-
nomically efficient if the submitted bids are equal to the
corresponding true valuations, i.e., bk(S) = vk(S) for all
S. Economic efficiency provides the best allocation of seats
for the benefit of the customer and an economically efficient
allocation ensures that no Pareto improvement can be further
achieved. However, bk(S) is private information with respect
to each bidder and the auctioneer cannot assert that the bidders
have submitted the true valuations as the bids. A bidder may
set bk(S) higher than vk(S) for better return but this will also
lower its chance of winning the auction as another bidder may
have set its bid lower than bk(S). In order to let the bidders
behave truthfully, we adopt the VCG mechanism to determine
the amount of payment that the customer should be charged
for accepting the offer made from (4), (6), or (7).
A. VCG Mechanism
We demonstrate the VCG-based charging mechanism for
the splittable service based on Problem (4), as an example,
in the sequel. For the non-splittable and private services, the
implementations are similar. Consider that bidder k may not
bid with the true valuation for a particular S and announce
bk(S) ≥ vk(S). Let X be the feasible region of (4), x∗ an
optimal solution of (4), and p∗ be its objective function value,
i.e.,
x∗ = argmin
x
{
∑
k∈K
∑
S∈Q
bk(S)xk(S)|x ∈ X},
p∗ = inf{
∑
k∈K
∑
S∈Q
bk(S)xk(S)|x ∈ X}.
Define
p∗−k , inf{
∑
l∈K\k
∑
S∈Q
bl(S)xl(S)|
∑
S∈Q
xl(S) ≤ 1,∀l ∈ K \ k,∑
l∈K\k
∑
S∈Q
|S|xl(S) ≥ qr,
xl(S) = {0, 1},∀S ∈ Q, l ∈ K \ k}. (8)
Note that the problem in (8) is different from (4) as k is
excluded from K. p∗−k is the “welfare” of the other bidders
in the absence of bidder k. In other words, it is the result of
the auction when bidder k is absent. Let bk = [bk(S)]S∈G and
b−k = [bl(S)]S∈G,l∈K\k be the set of bids submitted by k and
those submitted by all other bidders other than k, respectively,
for all the seat combinations. The VCG mechanism imposes
that each bidder should charge the amount of “damage” it
introduces to the community, i.e., the set of all operators. We
denote the total charge received by k of providing the service
based on the submitted bids by ck(b−k). For each k, we set
ck(b−k) as the following:
ck(b−k) , p∗−k −
∑
l∈K\k
∑
S∈Q
bl(S)x∗l (S). (9)
ck(b−k) is interpreted as the “social charge” of k, which is
equivalent to the difference of total welfare of other bidders
without k’s involvement and that with k’s involvement.
Let b = (bk,b−k) and consider the utility uk(b) of bidder
k as uk(b) = ck(b) − vk(x(b)), where ck(b) is the charge
received by k and vk(x(b)) is the sum of valuation of the
service provided by k based on x ∈ X . So the utility is
defined as the difference between the “revenue” and “cost”.
Each bidder k tries to maximize its utility by manipulating its
declared bids, as
max
bk
(ck(b)− vk(x(b))) . (10)
Social welfare is the sum of the utilities of all bidders
expressed as
∑
k uk(b) =
∑
k ck(b)− vk(x(b)).
Theorem 2. Minimizing the total bid received by the oper-
ators, i.e., solving (4), (6), or (7), can maximize the social
welfare if and only if all bidders submit their bids as their
true valuations.
Proof: Let bk(x) be the sum of bids received by k based
on x. By (9), (10) becomes
max
bk
p−k − ∑
l∈K\k
bl(x(b))− vk(x(b))
 .
Since p−k is independent of bk, bidder k will declare bk based
on
max
bk
− ∑
l∈K\k
bl(x(b))− vk(x(b))
 . (11)
The only way that bidder k influences the result of (11) is
through the choice of x. In other words, it will declare bk
that leads the auctioneer to x ∈ X that solves
min
x∈X
 ∑
l∈K\k
bl(x) + vk(x)
 . (12)
If bk(x) = vk(x), for the splittable service, (12) is equivalent
to (4). On the other hand, if (12) is equivalent to (4), bk(x)
will be equal to vk(x) for all k. This completes the proof for
the splittable service. For the non-splittable (private) service,
the proof is similar by comparing (12) with (6) ((7)).
Corollary 1. Telling the truth, i.e., vk(x) = bk(x) for all k,
is a socially optimal strategy.
By contraposition, we immediately have the following
corollary:
Corollary 2. If vk(x) is not equal to bk(x) for some k, the
allocation based on (4), (6), or (7) may not be socially optimal.
From (9), we can see that the charge received by k does not
depend on its declared bid bk, but the private information of all
7other bidders, i.e., b−k. In other words, it will not charge with
a higher amount if it submits bid bk(S) > vk(S). Thus there is
no incentive for a rational bidder to announce false information
and thus the charging mechanism is incentive compatible. This
can be realized with the following theorem:
Theorem 3. Submitting bids as the true valuations is a
dominant strategy under the VCG-based charging mechanism.
Proof: For the splittable service, the auctioneer deter-
mines the winners by solving (4), and thus
x(b) ∈ argmin
x∈X
(∑
k
bk(x)
)
= argmin
x∈X
 ∑
l∈K\k
bl(x) + bk(x)
 .
(13)
By Theorem 2, the mechanism will result in x based on (12)
if bidder k declares bk = vk, where vk = [vk(S)]S∈Q. Since
the declaration of bk does not depend on other bidders and
increase in bids will not improve its profit, truth telling is a
dominant strategy of bidder k. The proof is similar for the
non-splittable and private services.
Therefore, if all other bidders submit their true valuations
as bids, one will reveal its true values as bids in the auction.
The mechanism can achieve the best economic efficiency and
all bidders will behave truthfully resulting in maximizing the
social welfare.
The auction exhibits choice-set monotonicity. As we allo-
cate the service from the bidders to the customer, when a new
bidder is introduced, all previously existing allocations are still
feasible and the introduction of the new bidder creates more
allocation choices. Moreover, the auction has the property of
no negative externalities. When bidder k participates in the
auction, it can charge ck, as given in (9), which is always
non-negative. If it does not win in the auction, its utility will
turn zero. Therefore, our VCG-based charging mechanism in
individually rational and hence strategy-proof [22].
Consider the splittable service. Recall that x∗ and p∗ are
the optimal solution of Problem (4) and its objective function
value, respectively. The total charge that the customer should
pay is∑
k∈K
ck(b−k) =
∑
k∈K
[
p∗−k −
(
p∗ −
∑
S∈Q
bk(S)x∗k(S)
)]
=
∑
k∈K
∑
S∈Q
bk(S)x∗k(S) +
∑
k∈K
(p∗−k − p∗)
= p∗ +
∑
k∈K
(p∗−k − p∗). (14)
The mechanism generates the total charge for the customer
which is asymptotically closed to that of the optimal auction,
i.e., p∗ from solving (4). When no single bidder has a
significant effect, p∗−k will be very close to p
∗ and the total
charge will tend to the social optimum p∗. Similar results also
hold for the non-splittable and private services.
B. Computation
By [23], integer programming is in NP (nondeterministic
polynomial time), so as Problems (4), (6), and (7) and their
k-exclusive counterparts. The sizes of these problems grow
with Q and K. The capacity of a vehicle, Q, is usually
fixed and small. As K is the number of operators interested
in the transportation request7, there are just a few operators
constituting the public transportation system in practice. Thus
the problems can still be solved effectively.
Based on (9), to determine ck(b−k) for each k, we need
to solve (4) and its k-exclusive counterpart once. Hence,
according to (14), to compute cs (cn or cp), we need to
solve (4) ((6) or (7)) and its k-exclusive counterpart K
times. For the splittable service, Problem (4) and the K k-
exclusive counterparts are computationally independent and
thus they can be solved in parallel. As to be verified in
Section V-D, the computation time required to determine the
charge for a practical system is reasonably short. Further, if the
problem and its counterparts are solved in parallel, the required
computation time will be even shorter. Hence, our approach
is computationally feasible. The siutations are similar for the
non-splittable and private services.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we verify the analytical results discussed
in the previous sections and evaluate the performance of the
charging mechanism. We set the capacity of each vehicle to
five, i.e., Q = 5, by following the standard of a intermediate-
size car. We consider the scenarios when sets of operators
of different size are interested in serving the transportation
request r, including having K equal to 1, 5, 10, 30, 50, and
100, which are sufficient to evaluate the performance of a
typical AV public transportation system spanning from a small
to a large scale. Note that the scenario with K = 1 is used as a
control representing a monopolistic environment. For each of
these scenarios, we generate 100 random cases. Each random
case is constructed by generating random bidding functions
bk(·) for the bidders, where the cost of occupying one seat
is assumed to be a random number in (0, 1]. The number of
available seats in each elected vehicle available at the time of
auctioning is randomly set between one and five. We perform
the simulations on a computer with Intel Core i7-3770 CPU
at 3.90 GHz and 16 GB of RAM. They are conducted in the
MATLAB environment, where the optimization problems are
addressed with YALMIP [24] and CPLEX [25].
A. Total Charges
We first examine the servability and the changes of total
charges for the three service types. Table I shows the number
of unservable cases among the 100 cases, for each service
type in each scenario. A case is deemed unservable when no
operator can elect a vehicle which can meet the occupancy
requirement of the request. In general, when the number of
7For the splittable service, an operator may elect multiple vehicles to fulfill
a transportation request and thus it may submit multiple sets of bids for its
vehicles. This can simply be considered as that it is split into multiple virtual
operators, each of which represents one of these vehicles. In practice, it is
unusually for an operator to be split into many virtual operators. Moreover,
the number of such virtual operators that one can raise is upper bounded by
the number of available seats Q. The capacity of an AV typically follows the
standard of a intermediate-size car, i.e., Q = 5.
8TABLE I
NUMBER OF UNSERVABLE CASES (AMONG 100).
K Service
No. of seats required
1 2 3 4 5
1
Splittable 0 19 44 65 87
Non-splittable 0 19 44 65 87
Private 87 87 87 87 87
5
Splittable 0 0 0 0 0
Non-splittable 0 0 6 34 74
Private 74 74 74 74 74
10
Splittable 0 0 0 0 0
Non-splittable 0 0 6 3 32
Private 32 32 32 32 32
30
Splittable 0 0 0 0 0
Non-splittable 0 0 0 0 0
Private 0 0 0 0 0
50
Splittable 0 0 0 0 0
Non-splittable 0 0 0 0 0
Private 0 0 0 0 0
100
Splittable 0 0 0 0 0
Non-splittable 0 0 0 0 0
Private 0 0 0 0 0
bidders increases, the unseravable cases vanish because the
chance of having one vehicle suitable for serving the request
becomes higher with a larger set of bidders. When the number
of seats required, qr, increases, the number of unservable cases
increases due to the more stringent occupancy requirement.
For comparing the service types, the private service is the
easiest to become unservable while the splittable service is the
hardest. As all seats in a vehicle are required, the occupancy
requirement for the private service is the most stringent. For
the splittable service, it is easier to get suitable vehicles to
serve the separated groups of passengers. When the size of
bidders is small (e.g., K = 5 or 10), the customer may only
have options from a subset of services among the three service
types. With a sufficient number of operators (e.g., K = 30 or
more), the customer can select among all the three services.
Moreover, the multi-tenant (K > 1) sencarios have relatively
far fewer unservable cases than the monopolistic (K = 1) one.
This shows that multi-tenancy can improve the servability of
the system.
Fig. 3 shows the charges for the three service types
computed from the VCG charging mechanism with different
numbers of seats required, qr, stated in the request and each
data point is the average of the servable cases. As the VCG
mechanism is not applicable for K = 1, the total charges for
the single bidder cases are set to the corresponding optimal
charges, i.e., p∗. For the splittable service, as shown in 3(a),
the total charge increases with qr. The total cost and the
growth rate of the cost in qr decrease with K. A lager K
results in a stronger competition, which leads to a lower cost.
The situation is similar for the non-splittable service given
in Fig. 3(b), but the charge differences between the scenarios
of different K become smaller when compared with those
shown in Fig. 3(a). In other words, the saving from a stronger
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Fig. 3. Charges computed by the VCG charging mechanism.
competition due to non-splittable service diminishes when
compared with the splittable service. The reason is that the
flexibility of allocating vehicles to the customer is lower and
thus the customer has smaller bargaining power on the bidders.
As shown in Fig. 3(c), the total charge for private service is
independent of the number of seats required as all seats in the
vehicle are required. As the monopolistic (1 bidder) senario
produces much higher charges, multi-tenancy can increase
market competition leading to lower service charges.
The charges induced from the VCG charging mechanism
will approach the optimal charges, i.e., ps, pn, and pp,
when no single bidder has significant effect (more results
on charge asymptoticity will be discussed in Section V-C).
Fig. 4 illustrates the optimal charges and the results are the
averages of the servable cases. For clear presentation, the bars
of the three service types are overlapped for each scenario.
Among the three service types, the splittable service incurs the
lowest charge while the private service acquires the highest.
This confirms the results given in Theorem 1. Similar to Fig.
3, a stronger competition (with more bidders) results in a
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Fig. 4. Optimal charges for the three service types.
lower charge. When the number of seats required is small, the
charges for splittable and non-splittable services are of similar
values and they are much lower than that for private service.
If the passengers do not mind to share the ride with other
people, the non-splittable service is worthwhile to take. When
the demand for seat occupancy grows, the difference between
the charges for non-splittable and private services decreases.
Hence, the private service becomes more worthwhile.
B. Truthfulness
Next we investigate the consequence of not telling the truth.
That is, the bidders intend to raise their bids (bk(S) > vk(S))
for potential higher profit. We illustrate the results based on a
particular random example of the K = 100 scenario used in
Section V-A. Table II gives the winners and their charges with
increasing bids for the cases of different qr, i.e., the number of
seats required for the request of splittable service. We consider
the cases with zero bid increase as the base cases. For those
with positive bid rise, we increase the bids of the winners of
their corresponding base cases with certain percentages. From
the results with qr equal to 1, 2, and 3, it is clear that an
increase of one’s bid does not increase its final charge but
possibly the others’ charges. When the increase is large (e.g.,
by 50%), it may lead to changes of winners. For example,
for qr = 1, Bidder 69 is the winner in the base case with
charge equal to 0.0295. An increase of its bid by 20% does
not help charge more (also 0.0295) while a larger increase
by 50% results in the change of winner to Bidder 82 with
a large charge of 0.0363. For qr equal to 4 and 5, it seems
that some bidders do improve their charges by raising their
bids. For example, for qr = 4, Bidder 69 can increase its
final charge from 0.0524 to 0.0577 by raising its bid for 20%.
However, this charge improvement does not come from Bidder
69’s bid increase but it is due to Bidder 60’s action. As seen
from (9), the charge ck(b−k) that a bidder k receives from
the auction is independent of its submitted bid bk. Hence, the
charge improvement due to one’s bid rise is just an illusion.
As a whole, an increase of one’s bid does not improve, or even
depresses, its utility and this potentially enhances the utilities
of other bidders only. Moreover, the customer may need to
pay more in the presence of untruthful bidders.
We further examine the total charges, instead of individual
charges, for the three service types. We define the “change
of charge” as α−ββ , where α and β are the total charges
with and without untruthfulness, respectively. The latter refers
to the total charge when all bidders report their bids as the
true valuations, i.e., bk(S) = vk(S) for all S and k. With
untruthfulness, some bidders raise their bids higher than the
valuations. Positive change of charge means that the customer
needs to pay more as a whole (not for a particular operator).
Fig. 5 gives the change of charge with different number of
untruthful bidders and different amount of bid rise. For each
simulation run, we randomly select 10%, 20%, or 50% of the
bidders as untruthful bidders, who raise their bids from the
true valuations by 10%, 20%, or 30%. In each case, the change
of charge is always nonnegative. For those without change of
charge, the bidders selected for bid increase are not the winners
of the auction. Their rise of bids will not affect the charges
to the customer. In reality, a bidder will not know if it would
be a winner before conducting the auction. So a rise of one’s
bid may not always make the system performance worse. For
the splittable service, the total charge tends to increase with
higher bid rise. However, the trends for the non-splittable and
private services are not obvious. As there is only one winner
in the auction for these two services, the change of charge
becomes sensitive to the selected group of untruthful bidders.
C. Asymptoticity of the Charges
We interrogate the asymptoticity of the charges as illustrated
in (14). We define “change of payment” as
∑
k ck−p∗
p∗ (based
on (14)). The smaller the change of payment, the smaller
the difference between the total charge and the total bid of
the optimal auction is. We consider two ways of generating
the random bids, i.e., with large and small variations. For
the former, all bids for occupying one seat are randomly
generated in (0, 1]. For the latter, the bids are constructed as
rand(0, 0.1]+0.5, where rand(0, 0.1] refers to a random num-
ber in (0, 0.1]. So the values of bids for each seat occupancy
with small variations are closer to each other. The results for
different K and qr are provided in Fig. 6 where the change of
payment is presented in the logarithmic scale and the large and
small variations are indicated as “(L)” and “(S)”, respectively.8
We compare the results of the two variations in pair for each
case and bids with smaller variations always result in smaller
change of payment. This confirms our interpretation of (14)
in Section IV, i.e., the total charge is close to the result of the
optimum auction when no single bidder has a significant effect.
It is unlikely to have a bidder affect the auction significantly
when the values of bids are close to each other.
D. Computation Time
We investigate the computation time for computing the
charges with the scenarios of K equal to 5, 10, 30, 50,
and 100. Fig. 7 shows the computation times required to
determine the total charges for the three service types, where
each data point is the average of 100 random cases. In general,
the three services require similar computation time, which is
proportional to K. Alhough our approach is designed to handle
8As the VCG mechanism is not applicable for the monopolistic scenario,
here we focus on those with K > 1.
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TABLE II
WINNERS AND THEIR CHARGES FOR THE SPLITTABLE SERVICE.
qr bid Winner’s ID Total
increase (Charge) charge
1
0% 69 0.0295(0.0295)
20% 69 0.0295(0.0295)
50% 82 0.0363(0.0363)
2
0% 69 82 0.0726(0.0363) (0.0363)
20% 69 82 0.0726(0.0363) (0.0363)
50% 60 79 0.1049(0.0524) (0.0524)
3
0% 69 79 82 0.1444(0.0481) (0.0481) (0.0481)
20% 69 79 82 0.1444(0.0481) (0.0481) (0.0481)
50% 38 41 60 0.2133(0.0711) (0.0711) (0.0711)
4
0% 60 69 79 82 0.2097(0.0524) (0.0524) (0.0524) (0.0524)
20% 41 69 79 82 0.2310(0.0577) (0.0577) (0.0577) (0.0577)
50% 29 38 41 0.3326(0.1904) (0.0711) (0.0711)
5
0% 41 60 69 79 82 0.3115(0.0623) (0.0623) (0.0623) (0.0623) (0.0623)
20% 38 60 69 79 82 0.3146(0.0629) (0.0629) (0.0629) (0.0629) (0.0629)
50% 29 36 38 84 0.4952(0.2039) (0.1220) (0.0846) (0.0846)
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(a) Splittable service.
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(b) Non-splittable service.
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(c) Private service.
Fig. 5. Change of charge with Truthfulness.
one service request, there may be multiple outstanding requests
needed to be processed at the same time in a pratical system. In
fact, our approach can facilitate two levels of parallelization to
make the computation efficient. First, as illustrated in Section
II-B, we can simply apply the pricing process to each of the
requests and obtain the corresponding charges simultaneously.
Second, as discussed in Section IV-B, the pricing process
can be further broken into multiple computational modules,
each of which can be run in parallel, due to the fact that
Problem (4) ((6) or (7)) and its k-exclusive counterparts are
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Fig. 6. Change of payment with different variations of bids.
Fig. 7. Computation time.
computationally independent. When higher performance is re-
quired in a practical environment, instead of a general-purpose
computer, a high-performance field-programmable gate array-
based computer [26] can be utilized to boost the performance
on computing the charges. Hence, the problems can be solved
in parallel and the computation of a total charge requires
much less time. This suggests that our approach can be made
efficient to implement in a practical system.
VI. CONCLUSION
To improve people’s standard of living, we may turn a
city into a smart city through smarter utilization of resources
with modern technologies. Transport is one of the main foci
in smart city research and development. With the advent of
AV technologies, AVs will become prevalent in the future
transportation system. Recently, a novel AV-based public
transportation system has been proposed and it is capable
of providing new forms of transportation services with high
efficiency, high flexibility, and low cost. For the benefit of pas-
sengers, multitenancy can increase market competition leading
to lower service charge and higher quality of service. This
paper is dedicated to studying the pricing issue of the multi-
tenant AV public transportation system supported by multiple
AV operators. We broaden the service options by introducing
three types of services, including the splittable, non-splittable,
and private services. We model the pricing process with
combinatorial auctions, where the operators bid for offering
the service requested by a customer. For each service type,
the winners of the auction are determined through an integer
linear program. To prevent the bidders from lying about
the true valuations in their bids, we propose a VCG-based
charging mechanism, which is strategy-proof and capable of
maximizing the social welfare, to settle the final charges.
We verify our analytical results and evaluate the performance
of the charging mechanism with extensive simulations. We
summarize the contributions achieved in this paper as follows:
(i) introducing multitenancy to the AV public transportation
system; (ii) identifying the splittable, non-splittable, and pri-
vate service types; (iii) modeling the pricing process with com-
binatorial auctions; (iv) formulating the winner determination
problems as integer linear programs; (v) proposing a strategy-
proof charging mechanism; (vi) deriving analytical results for
the pricing process and the charging mechanism; and (vii)
verifying the results with extensive simulations. In the future,
we will study a coalition game-based pricing for the system,
in which the operators may exchange private information for
higher profit.
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